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 Non Technical Summary 
The continuous generation of innovative products, processes and services is widely 
considered to be the primary key to firms’ competitiveness and growth. The major input in 
this innovation process is unique knowledge generated by investments in research and 
development (R&D). Interestingly enough, though, private firms have found it extremely 
difficult to obtain external capital for funding such crucial investments into their future. Banks 
as the main provider of external funds for the vast majority of firms seem ill-equipped to 
provide the necessary funding. Their shortcomings are typically explained by the nature of 
R&D projects, which suffer from both information imperfections and asymmetries.  
We adopt a novel perspective by challenging the dominant assumption that all banks are 
equally subject to suffering from information asymmetries in financing private R&D. We 
suggest that firms can signal the value of their R&D investment and overcome the inherent 
information asymmetries. We focus on two mechanisms for signaling. On the one hand, firms 
can signal based on past innovation success. We will rely on firm’s patent stock to measure 
this. On the other hand, firms can signal based on relations with trusted external actors such as 
a joint venture investor or the government (through a subsidy). We consider all of these 
mechanisms and allow for heterogeneities across industries and banks in the valuation of the 
signals. 
We test this theoretical framework empirically for more than 7,000 firm observations on 
R&D investments in Germany between 2002 and 2006. Unique access to the database of 
Germany’s leading credit rating agency on the population of German firms and their main 
bank relationship allows us to construct novel variables on the overall portfolio of the firm’s 
main bank. We have the rare opportunity to link this information to firm characteristics, R&D 
investment, patent statistics and venture capital investments based on a non-heuristic link.  
The empirical results corroborate our theoretical model only for the signaling value of 
firm’s patent stock. Firms can shift the threshold of a bank’s risk considerations to lower 
levels of specialization if they can signal the value of their R&D activities through successful 
patent activities. On the basis of these findings, implications are derived for academic 
research, management and policy making. 
 Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Kontinuierliche Innovationsaktivitäten werden weithin als wichtige Voraussetzung für die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und das Wachstum von Unternehmen angesehen. Der wichtigste Input 
in den Innovationsprozess ist spezifisches und neues Wissen, das durch Investitionen in 
Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) entsteht. Allerdings ist es für private Unternehmen äußerst 
schwierig, sich externe Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten für diese Art von Zukunftsinvestitionen 
zu erschließen. Insbesondere Banken, die für die Mehrzahl der Unternehmen die bedeutendste 
Quelle für externe Finanzierung sind, scheinen nur bedingt in der Lage zu sein, FuE zu 
finanzieren. Dies wird typischerweise mit der Natur von FuE-Aktivitäten erklärt, weil dabei 
große Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Unternehmen und externen Investoren entstehen. 
In dieser Arbeit stellen wir die allgemeine Annahme, dass alle Banken gleichermaßen von 
diesen Informationsasymmetrien betroffen sind, in Frage. Wir gehen davon aus, dass 
Unternehmen Informationsasymmetrien reduzieren können, indem sie den Wert ihrer FuE 
Aktivitäten den potentiellen Investoren signalisieren. Mindestens zwei unterschiedlich Signale 
sind denkbar: erstens, in der Vergangenheit erfolgreich abgeschlossene FuE-Projekte oder 
Patente und zweitens, Kooperationen und Partnerschaften mit externen Akteuren, wie z.B. 
VC-Gebern oder Ministerien. Wir betrachten in dieser Arbeit beide Signale und lassen zu, 
dass deren Wirkung und Stärke von Bank zu Bank und Branche zu Branche unterschiedlich 
ist. 
Wir testen unsere Hypothesen für einen Datensatz mit mehr als 7000 Unternehmen mit Sitz in 
Deutschland. Der Mikrodatensatz deckt die Jahre 2002 bis 2006 ab und enthält neben Daten 
zu allgemeinen Firmencharakteristika sowohl Informationen zu den FuE Ausgaben der 
Unternehmen als auch zur Portfoliozusammensetzung der wichtigsten Bank, mit der das 
Unternehmen zusammenarbeitet. Wir sind in der Lage, diese Informationen, direkt mit Daten 
zu Patenten, öffentlicher Förderung und Venture Capital Beteiligungen zu ergänzen. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen unsere Hypothesen nur bezüglich der Signalwirkung 
von Patenten. Die Unternehmen können die Risikoeinschätzungen der Banken positiv 
beeinflussen, wenn sie ihre Forschungsstärke durch Patente untermauern. Des Weiteren 
zeigen wir, dass die Reduktion von Informationsasymmetrien insbesondere in Sektoren 
auftritt, in denen große Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Kommerzialisierbarkeit von FuE besteht.  
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Abstract: 
Information economics has emerged as the primary theoretical lens for framing financing 
decisions in firm R&D investment. Successful outcomes of R&D projects are either ex-ante 
impossible to predict or the information is asymmetrically distributed between inventors and 
investors. As a result, bank lending for firm R&D has been rare. However, firms can signal 
the value of their R&D activities and as a result reduce the information deficits that block the 
availability of external funding. In this study we focus on three types of signals: Firm’s 
existing patent stock, the presences of a joint venture investor and whether the firm has 
received a government R&D subsidy. We argue theoretically that all of these signals have the 
potential to alter the risk assessment of the firm’s main bank. Additionally, we explore 
heterogeneities in these risk assessments arising from the industry level and the main bank’s 
portfolio. We test our theoretical predictions for a sample of more than 7,000 firm 
observations in Germany over a multi-year period. Our theoretical predictions are only 
supported for firms’ past patent activity while other signals fail to alter the risk assessment of 
a firm’s main bank. Besides, we confirm that the risk evaluation is not randomly distributed 
across bank-firm dyads but depends on industry and bank characteristics. 
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An Information Economics Perspective on Main Bank 
Relationships and Firm R&D	
1 Introduction 
The continuous generation of innovative products, processes and services is widely 
considered to be the primary key to the competitiveness and growth of firms and of entire 
economies (e.g. Grant, 1996; Schumpeter, 1942). The major input of this innovation process 
is unique knowledge generated by investments in research and development. Interestingly 
enough, though, private firms have found it extremely difficult to obtain external capital for 
funding these crucial investments into their future. This restricts the available funds to internal 
cash flows and scarce, highly selective venture capital investors (e.g. Levitas & McFadyen, 
2009). For example, Bureau van Dijk’s ZEPHYER database records a yearly average of only 
250 venture capital investments in Germany between 1998 and 2010, the fourth largest 
economy in the world with a population of roughly 3.1 million firms. 
This situation is paradoxical as most managers and management research acknowledges the 
importance of knowledge production and innovation for firm performance (e.g. Grant, 1996; 
Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). Entire economies are searching for strategies for entering the 
knowledge-based economy and reaping the benefits in terms of investment, employment and 
growth. Among the most ambitious of these plans are the Barcelona and Lisbon Strategies 
with their aim of making the European Union the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world. In reality, though, the knowledge-based economy finds itself without a 
mechanism for financing the underlying firm R&D investment. Several scholars have 
highlighted the need for banks - as the main provider of external financing – to be brought 
back into the picture. The relevance of this topic is acknowledged in the US, for instance, by 
Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps (Phelps & Tilman, 2010), and in Europe (e.g. Peutz, Meeus, 
Nooteboom & Noorderhaven, 2010). 
These shortcomings in capital markets are typically explained by the nature of R&D 
projects, which suffer both from information imperfections and asymmetries (for a 
comprehensive review see Hall, 2005). Information imperfections stem from inherent 
uncertainties about the technological and commercial viability of novel products for which no 
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ex ante probabilities of success exist (Amit, Glosten & Muller, 1990). Information 
asymmetries arise from the fact that firms possess knowledge of the value of their R&D 
projects which is superior to that  of external investors (Ahuja, Coff & Lee, 2005). These 
investors, therefore, bear the extra risk of hidden information and hidden actions. 
We develop theory based on the renewed interest in financing R&D and innovation in both 
from strategic management (e.g. Levitas & McFadyen, 2009) and finance literature (e.g. 
Herrera & Minetti, 2007; Benfratello, Schiantarelli & Sembenelli, 2008). We adopt a novel 
perspective based on information economics theory by challenging the dominant assumption 
that all banks are equally subject to suffering from information asymmetries in financing 
private R&D projects. We acknowledge that banks cannot produce the relevant information 
on technological innovation themselves, although they are uniquely positioned to aggregate 
the outcomes of the information production of other firms in the industry in the client 
portfolio, i.e. there exist information externalities (Stiglitz, 2002) originating from 
heterogeneous client portfolios of different banks. We contrast this perspective by relying on 
portfolio theory which posits the opposite relationship: Correlated risks in specialized bank 
portfolios should make R&D investment in client firms less likely (Markowitz, 1991). 
Finally, we allow for a proactive role of firms in signaling the value of their R&D activities to 
banks through patenting, obtaining government R&D subsidies or venture capital investment. 
We test this theoretical framework empirically for more than 7,000 firm observations on 
R&D investments in Germany between 2002 and 2006. Unique access to the database of 
Germany’s leading credit rating agency on the population of German firms and their main 
bank relationship allows us to construct novel variables on the overall portfolio of each of the 
firms’ main bank. We have the rare opportunity to link this information to firm 
characteristics, R&D investment, patent statistics and venture capital investments based on a 
direct, non-heuristic link. In terms of industry, firm and variable coverage, the dataset is, to 
the best of our knowledge, unique in its breadth and representativeness. 
The empirical results corroborate our theoretical model. Firm R&D investment is higher if 
its main bank is either highly diversified or very active in its particular industry. The 
information externality effect is restricted to sectors in which ther are major uncertainties 
about commercial application. Firms can shift the threshold of a bank’s risk considerations to 
lower levels of specialization if they can signal the value of their R&D activities through 
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successful patent activities. Successful applications for government R&D subsidies and 
venture capital investment, though, are valuable in themselves for firm R&D investment but 
fail to alter bank risk assessments significantly. On the basis of these findings, implications 
are derived for academic research, management and policy making. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2, following this introduction, 
outlines our theoretical framework culminating in the derivation of hypotheses in section 3. In 
section 4 we present our empirical study including data, variables and methodologies. Section 
5 presents the results of these analyses followed by derived conclusions in section 6. 
2 Theory 
We choose information economics and related signaling theory as our main theoretical 
building blocks (e.g. Stiglitz, 2002; Ahuja et al., 2005). We shall focus more precisely on 
signaling theory’s relevance to bank financing of private R&D activities. To achieve this we 
combine research from finance literature on bank lending decisions (e.g. Rajan & Zingales, 
2001) with the literature on knowledge production through R&D. We start by modeling the 
R&D investment decision of any given firm: 
R&D (Industry characteristics, existing knowledge, funds) 
A firm’s R&D investment decisions can be described as a function of the characteristics of 
its industry, its existing knowledge, and the available funds. This study will focus on available 
funds, while industry characteristics and knowledge are largely treated as control variables1. 
We conceptualize a firm’s available funds as a general liquidity pool from which a firm can 
draw financial resources for its R&D investment. We explicitly acknowledge that R&D 
investment competes with other firm functions (e.g. marketing) for these funds. The pool of 
available funds determines the cost of capital for a company. Firms will invest in projects 
                                                 
1 Important industry characteristics encompass the degree of competition in the product market requiring 
investments in new products and processes (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942; Aghion, Harris, Howitt & Vickers, 
2001), technological and legal opportunities for appropriating returns (e.g. Teece, 1986) as well as providing 
technological opportunities (e.g. McGahan & Silverman, 2006). Existing knowledge stocks (e.g. patents or 
employee skills) allow the firm to benefit from complementarities in their current R&D investments (e.g. 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
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(R&D or other) only if the expected returns exceed the cost of capital based on a net present 
value rational. The pool of funds has three primary components: 
Funds (Internal cash flows, equity finance, bank loans) 
Most firms rely on internal cash flows for their R&D projects (Kim, Mauer & Sherman, 
1998; Bond, Harhoff & van Reenen, 1999; Haid & Weigand, 2001; Harhoff, 1998). When it 
comes to external financing of innovations, venture capital financing has received a lot of 
attention in the literature (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 2001a; Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002; 
Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004). It is generally acknowledged that access to venture capital is 
constrained for the majority of firms because of limited availability and the highly selective 
nature of venture capital investors who target a small number of investments with the 
potential for high returns (e.g. Eckhardt, Shane & Delmar, 2006). Banks, however, as the 
primary provider of external financing for the vast majority of firms, appear ill-equipped to 
finance R&D investments (Bozkaya & Potterie, 2008).  
Assuming a perfect market for capital, financing R&D investments should not be different 
from any other investment decision and firms should opt for all projects with a positive net 
present value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, the assumption does not hold because of 
the nature of R&D (for recent reviews, see Hall, 2005 and Hall, 2009). The outcomes of R&D 
are generally uncertain. This uncertainty has two primary dimensions (Amit et al., 1990). 
First, there is a substantial degree of technological uncertainty about the success of an R&D 
project. Materials and procedures are almost by definition new and largely untested. 
Probability distributions for the success of an R&D project are difficult or even impossible to 
predict at the early stages (Hall, 2005). R&D investments provide very little collateral. Half of 
all R&D expenditures finance wages for skilled scientists and engineers (Hall, 2005). 
Investments in physical research assets and laboratories are often highly specific to a firm or 
even a project making it difficult to re-deploy, sell or use for others (Herrera & Minetti, 
2007). Secondly, there is a large degree of uncertainty about whether the firm will be 
economically successful with its technologically new products and processes. A significant 
proportion of product innovations end up as economic failures because they do not meet 
customer needs or because competitors are quick in their imitation or substitution activities, 
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which erodes margins from the pioneering advantage (Dos Santos & Peffers, 1995; Gourville, 
2006). 
Even so, research shows that these underlying uncertainties are not equally exogenous to 
managers and external capital providers. Endogenous uncertainty can be overcome by firm 
activities over time while exogenous uncertainties exist independently of any firm actions 
(Folta & O'Brien, 2004; Cuypers & Martin, 2009). Firms perform R&D to resolve 
endogenous uncertainties through experimentation, testing and simulation. In that sense, R&D 
is a sequential process in which firms uncover information and reduce endogenous 
uncertainty at each stage of the process (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). There is a long time 
span between the start of an R&D project and the appearance of revenues from it, i.e. when 
the uncertainty is ultimately resolved and success or failure is apparent to actors outside of the 
firm. Empirical estimates predict this time duration to be between four and five years albeit 
with significant differences across industry (e.g. Pakes & Schankerman, 1984). Hence, firms 
have significant time advantages in discovering potentials or failures within R&D projects 
oder external partners, from whom the same uncertainties remain exogenous. This gives rise 
to an information asymmetry that insiders can exploit (Aboody & Lev, 2000, Ahuja et al., 
2005).  
Banks are even more disadvantaged in this situation than equity investors because banks’ 
have limited opportunities for directing/monitoring the use of their funds and they do not 
benefit from any resulting profits beyond the contractually fixed interest rate (Hennart, 1994). 
Moreover, in their lending decisions, all banks are equally subject to legal and regulatory 
constraints imposed by their institutional environment (e.g. Bank for International Settlement, 
2005). 
Financing R&D investments is therefore characterized by a combination of information that 
is either unavailable (exogenous uncertainty) or asymmetrically distributed between the firm 
and its external capital providers (endogenous uncertainty). Appropriate risk premiums for 
individual borrowers cannot be assessed (Stiglitz, 2002) and firms find themselves credit-
constrained because banks will only set high, average risk premiums (Aghion, Fally & 
Scarpetta, 2007). As a result, the pool of funds available for R&D investment in a firm is 
deprived of bank financing. 
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An emerging stream of literature from finance and strategic management is beginning to 
emphasize heterogeneities among banks and firm’s signaling. The literature on banks and 
innovation financing is still scarce. Positive relations have been found for the development of 
the regional banking system (Benfratello et al., 2008) and relationship length (Herrera & 
Minetti, 2007). Negative relationships stem from government ownership of banks (Sapienza, 
2004; Haselmann, Katharina & Weder di Mauro, 2009). Levitas et al. (2009) contribute to 
strategic management literature. They discern the value of signaling (through patents and 
distribution agreements) for overcoming financial constraints in small firms by attracting 
venture capital investors. 
3 Hypotheses development 
All of the theory presented so far rests on the important assumption that all banks draw from 
identical pools of information and should therefore suffer from identical degrees of 
information deficits. We question this assumption and argue that information is distributed 
asymmetrically between banks, too. We concede that the specific uncertainties related to 
R&D investments of a particular firm are equally exogenous to all banks. However, 
information - on technological feasibility as well as market success  - is produced by other 
firms in the same industry. At least parts of the uncertainties are therefore endogenous to 
these firms. We argue that banks are heterogeneous in their ability to access this information. 
What is more, we will set out the opportunities for the focal firm i to signal the value of its 
R&D activities and influence the availability of bank financing. 
3.1 Information externalities from a firm’s main bank client portfolio 
Banks differ in their level of engagement with client firms. Boot et al. (2000) present a 
dichotomy of bank lending with varying levels in between. Transaction lending is closely 
related to brokerage activities where it is sufficient for the bank to lend based on a 
standardized transaction. Relationship lending, though, requires borrower-specific 
information for activities such as screening and monitoring (for a review see Boot, 2000). The 
relation specificity can provide banks with access to private data about the financed firm 
which can lead to a quasi-monopolistic banking position and superior benefits from future 
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business with the particular client (Boot & Thakor, 2000). We shall focus on a specific 
relationship, i.e. a firm’s main bank, defined as the bank that a firm considers its primary 
source for all banking services. Within all relationship lending, main banks are uniquely 
positioned for acquisition of information about their client firms (Herrera & Minetti, 2007). 
We construct a simple theoretical model to investigate the effect of the client portfolio of a 
firm’s main bank on the firm’s R&D investment which can be easily extended. We assume 
two identical firms is and js. Both operate in industry s. Bank A is the main bank of firm is, 
bank B is the main bank of firm js. Banks A and B are identical, except for their client 
portfolio. Each bank has only two firms in its portfolio. Bank A’s portfolio consists of firm is 
and identical firm ks which operates in the same industry; for short PA(is, ks). It is further 
assumed that industry s consists only of three firms is, js and ks. Bank B’s portfolio 
encompasses firm js and identical firm lt from a different industry t; in short PB(js, lt). 
We will develop a purely comparative argument for the R&D investments of firms is and js. 
We make the following assumptions: All firms have equal propensities to invest in R&D. The 
underlying uncertainties and adverse selection problems for the particular R&D investments 
are identical for bank A and B. They are fully exogenous to each bank. However, the portfolio 
composition can provide bank A with an information advantage over bank B. Firms can 
overcome endogenous uncertainties through various forms of R&D, market research, 
prototyping, simulations, etc. All firms reveal information to their main banks through their 
transactions and loan applications. Substantial parts of this information can be expected to be 
private and not available to the general public. This information may include competitive 
interactions, future product and market plans as well as revenue streams (Boot & Thakor, 
2000). It is important to note that the private information is produced by the individual firm 
and only aggregated by its main bank which is uniquely positioned to do so. The bank does 
not necessarily learn in the narrow sense of exploring causal relationships but benefits from 
information externalities based on its client portfolio (Stiglitz, 2002). It is an externality 
because the bank does not directly and economically reimburse its other clients for the 
provision of this particular information. Hence, bank A and bank B draw from different pools 
of information in their lending decisions. The bank with the more relevant information can be 
expected to be in a position to assess risk premiums for individual firms more accurately than 
the general, high-risk premium. As a result, more funds will be available to its clients and, all 
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other things being equal, the firm doing business with this bank should be able to make a 
comparatively greater investment in R&D. 
The relevance of the information externality of the main bank for firms is and js is greatest if 
the information stems from a similar technological and market context, i.e. from competitors 
in the same industry (Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell, 2000). Hence, PA(is, ks) can be expected 
to deliver more relevant information externalities than PB(js, lt) because bank A can obtain 
information from firm ks which operates in the same industry as is. Given that the pool of 
relevant information is finite, i.e. from all firms in a given sector, a bank that has a greater 
number of such firms as its clients is more likely to benefit from information externalities. 
Hence, information asymmetries between bank A and bank B emerge from their market share 
with firms in sector s. 
In a typical loan application process a bank will benchmark the information of a prospective 
borrower against key figures from its other clients in the same sector. This comparison is 
often times based on information stemming from other lending contracts which is not publicly 
available. The quality of such benchmarks is expected to be higher for banks that draw from a 
larger pool of industry information  than banks with a comparatively narrower pool. In theory, 
firms could be expected to avoid certain banks in the first place because of the danger of 
unintentional knowledge spillovers to competitors. However, in reality, strong safeguards are 
in place to prevent banks from revealing information about one client to another client. The 
penalties would be high in terms of both legal liability and reputational losses (e.g. Degryse & 
Ongena, 2001).  
We propose: 
Hypothesis 1: R&D investment of a firm increases with the degree of 
market share of its main bank’s corporate client portfolio in its 
industry. 
However, the degree of specialization of its client portfolio is not an isolated information 
provision tool for the bank. A high degree of specialization in one industry would also imply 
that the risks involved from the technology or market side are highly correlated. This follows 
the basic rationale that banks manage the risks originating from their clients for the portfolio 
as a whole rather than individually (Markowitz, 1991). Banks can reduce the systemic risk of 
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the overall portfolio by combining uncorrelated risks (Markowitz, 1952). Following this 
portfolio theory logic, PA(is, ks) contains more risk than PB(js, lt) because the risks originating 
from firms js and lt can be expected to be less correlated since they operate in different 
sectors, i.e. market and technology environments, respectively. Bank A can be expected to 
demand a higher risk premium from its client is than does bank B from js solely based soley on 
the risk exposure of its portfolio. As a result, available funds for is should be comparatively 
lower, resulting in less R&D investment. We suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: R&D investment of a firm decreases with the degree of 
specialization of its main bank’s corporate client portfolio in its 
industry. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive. The former is denominated by the size of 
the industry the latter is dominated by the size of a bank’s client portfolio. Banks with a small 
portfolio can easily have a portfolio which is dominated by clients from a single industry (i.e. 
high degree of specialization) while these clients represent only a small fraction of all firms in 
the industry (i.e. the bank has a small market share in the industry). The information 
externality logic suggests that banks benefit equally from every additional firm that they can 
take into their client portfolio. However, the aggregation of information from a bank’s 
portfolio entails costs for the bank. These costs are especially high if the information is 
dispersed and, hence, difficult to screen (Koput, 1997). This effect is most pronounced if a 
bank is highly diversified across a large number of industries, i.e. the degree of portfolio 
specialization is low. Information screening becomes increasingly effective and efficient if 
fewer industry information domains have to be covered. Information processing at a bank can 
be expected to be especially productive if it draws from a large pool of information based on a 
large market share in a given industry and a high degree of specialization in this industry 
making the screening of the information more efficient. A bank with these characteristics 
should possess superior information for setting adequate risk premiums for its clients in that 
particular industry. This in turn, should enable these client firms to invest more in R&D. We 
put forward: 
Hypothesis 3: R&D investment of a firm increases if its main bank has 
both a large market share in its industry and a high degree of 
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specialization of its main bank’s corporate client portfolio in its 
industry, i.e. there is a positive moderating effect. 
Finally, the degree of uncertainty (both exogenous and endogenous) is not equally 
distributed across all industries. Especially at the “research” stage, which is not yet directed at 
a particular product, technological and market potentials are highly uncertain compared to the 
“development” stage, in which potential revenue streams are beginning to emerge (for a 
recent review, see Czarnitzki, Hottenrott & Thorwarth, 2011). It can take several years 
between the start of an R&D project and the generation of economic returns (e.g. in 
pharmaceuticals) or just several months (e.g. in service sectors where production and 
consumption are almost instantaneous) (Berry, Shankar, Parish, Cadwallader & Dotzel, 2006). 
Hence, the level of uncertainty of innovation activities in an industry is a function of the time 
it takes for an R&D project to be ready for application. This distance to application has often 
been linked to the importance of scientific knowledge from universities which is closer to 
academic research and further removed from industrial commercialization (e.g. Siegel, 
Waldman, Atwater & Link, 2004; Agrawal, 2006). Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2002) identify 
important differences among industries in the usage and importance of academic knowledge. 
We argue that the distance to application increases the uncertainty of the innovation activities 
in an industry. This, in turn, increases the potentials for benefitting from information 
asymmetries because the final resolution of fundamental uncertainties through observable 
market success is further removed in the future. At the same time, the risk of financing R&D 
increases if potential revenue streams are further delayed in the future (Czarnitzki et al., 
2011). 
We conclude: 
Hypothesis 4: The positive effects of main bank industry market share 
and the negative effects of main bank industry specialization on firm 
R&D investment are greater in industries which rely heavily on 
knowledge from scientific sources. 
3.2 Signaling through reputation and legitimacy 
So far, we have considered mechanisms only on the bank side and their ability to overcome 
information asymmetries through externalities. However, firms have additional opportunities 
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to overcome the information asymmetries by signaling the value of their R&D activities. We 
follow Ndofor et al. (2004) and define a signal as “conduct and observable attributes that alter 
the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market about unobservable 
attributes and intentions (p.688)”. This is a deviation from the theory outlined in the previous 
section as firms is and js in the model are no longer considered to be identical. They 
differentiate themselves through firm-specific signaling. A credible signal will allow a bank to 
provide a more accurate risk assessment on a firm’s R&D investment, resulting in more 
available funds and subsequently increased R&D investment. We will explore signals based 
on firms past actions (patenting) as well as legitimacy that can be transferred from ties to 
established actors and institutions (government R&D subsidies and venture capital investors). 
The value of signaling through past actions is rooted in theory of firm reputation (Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005). Levitas et al. (2009) investigates the value of patents as 
signals for attracting venture capital investors and corroborates it for a sample of firms from 
the pharmaceutical industry. Patents are a tangible representation of a successful innovation. 
Moreover, the patent office requires a certain degree of novelty in order to grant a patent 
(Encaoua, Guellec & Martinez, 2006). The existence of a patent therefore also allows 
inferences to be drawn about the quality of the underlying R&D. Patents can be interpreted as 
signals of future revenue streams. These may come from possessing a temporary advantage 
on the product market or through generating license fees (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). 
Hence, a main bank’s risk concerns based on correlated risks in its client portfolio should be 
reduced. 
Other potential signals are not rooted in a firm’s past actions but in being associated with 
authoritative actors (Rindova et al., 2005). This perspective is rooted in institutional theory. 
Organizations can gain legitimacy and hence access to resources through external validation 
in establishing institutional linkages with established institutions or succeeding in contests 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Rao, 1994). We focus predominantly on a firm’s ability to attract 
external funds for R&D or, more precisely, government R&D subsidies and venture capital 
investment. Venture capital investors are known to be highly selective in their investment 
decisions (Eckhardt et al., 2006). They monitor firms intensely, conclude 
growth/performance-oriented contracts, facilitate crucial personnel decisions and provide 
additional services (e.g. access to strategic alliances) (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 2001b). As a 
result, the chances that the firm will be successful in the future and generate positive returns 
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should increase. On the basis of this signal, banks should therefore be able to provide 
additional funds for the firm and its R&D investment. Similarly, many governments provide 
R&D grants for firms to stimulate R&D investment. Information requirements in applications 
are extensive and competition for grants is intense (Czarnitzki & Toole, 2007). Successful 
grant awards are highly selective and can signal the exceptional value of an R&D project 
(Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Kleer, 2010). Banks may therefore rely on this external assessment 
for overcoming information asymmetries. We propose: 
Hypothesis 5: A firm’s R&D investment increases with the degree of 
market share of its main bank’s corporate client portfolio in its 
industry and this effect is reinforced by the patent stock of the focal 
firm, the presence of a venture capital investor or a government R&D 
subsidy, i.e. there is a positive moderating effect. 
Hypothesis 6: A firm’s R&D investment decreases with the degree of 
specialization of its main bank’s corporate client portfolio in its 
industry, but this effect is mitigated by the firm’s patent stock or if the 
focal firm has attracted a venture capital investor or received a 
government R&D subsidy, i.e. there is a positive moderating effect. 
4  Empirical Study 
4.1 Data 
We construct a unique panel dataset for testing the theoretical predictions. Data 
requirements are extensive because comprehensive information is required for banks and their 
client portfolio across multiple industries. What is more, the bank information needs to be 
linked to firm R&D investment. We achieve this by linking multiple databases in Germany. 
The crucial starting point is the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP). 
This is a firm-level database collected by Creditreform, the leading credit rating agency in 
Germany. Since 1999, ZEW has been receiving a full copy of Creditreform’s data-warehouse 
of firm level data and constructing the panel twice a year. Creditreform collects its data on the 
basis of regional firm registries. The Creditreform data cover nearly the entire population of 
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3 million German firms with a few exceptions that are not legally required to register with the 
authorities (e.g. farmers). The Creditreform data are also the German input for the widely 
used AMADEUS database. Creditreform provides credit information and insurance services 
based on its data. Hence, the Creditreform data covers information that allows an assessment 
of a firm's credit worthiness. Most importantly for our study, it contains firms’ bank relations, 
including the bank that firms consider as their main bank. Data quality can be considered to 
be high since keeping information on financial solvency and relationships up to dare is a core 
part of Creditreform’s business model of and firms are not overly concerned about revealing 
their bank relationships (similar information can be found on a typical invoice). Given the 
population character of the database, we can calculate the industry composition of each 
bank’s client portfolio. The bank information is very precise based on the German eight-digit 
bank code, which allows a precise identification of the banks’ location and type (e.g. private 
bank vs. savings bank). Based on this information, we can track 2,432 banks. The banking 
code is mandatory for banks in Germany for obtaining a banking license. Coverage is 
therefore not limited. It should be acknowledged that the database does not contain 
information on the extent of each bank’s lending engagement with individual firms. To the 
best of our knowledge, no such database is publicly available or accessible. 
We link this dataset to the “Mannheim Innovation Panel” (MIP) which provides information 
on firm R&D investment; the dependent variable of our analyses. The dataset is drawn as a 
representative, stratified random sample based on the German MUP firm population. In 
contrast to other studies analyzing bank-based financing for innovation we can therefore form 
perfect matches between the two databases, i.e. we do not have to rely on regional banking 
indicators (e.g. Benfratello et al., 2008) or statistical matching. The MIP survey is conducted 
annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim) on behalf of the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. For our study we use data from the 
2002-06 surveys and analyze 7,294 firm observations from 4,363 firms. The panel is 
unbalanced.  
The MIP survey targets R&D decision makers. These can be heads of R&D departments, 
innovation managers or CEOs, which is most likely the case in smaller firms where no 
elaborate functional structures exist. Several mechanisms are in place to secure the quality of 
the survey and its results. All core constructs in the survey follow the OECD’s “Oslo Manual” 
on measuring innovation inputs, outputs and processes (OECD, 2005). Furthermore, the MIP 
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is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European 
Union. CIS methodology and questionnaires have been refined over the years in international 
application. They are subject to extensive pre-testing and piloting in various countries, 
industries and firms with regard to interpretability, reliability and validity (Laursen & Salter, 
2006). This multinational application of CIS surveys guarantees quality management and 
assurance. CIS data have been the basis for several recent publications in highly ranked 
management journals (e.g. Laursen & Salter, 2006; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). 
The merged dataset contains precise identifiers for the European Patent Office statistics as 
well as the Bureau van Dijk ZEPHYR since it is also the basis for the AMADEUS database. 
The former linkage allows us to obtain the number of patents granted to each firm, the second 
one tracks venture capital investments. The final dataset contains 7,294 observations from 
4,363 firms between 2002 and 2006 encompassing firm, innovation and R&D characteristics, 
bank information, patent activity and venture capital investments. 
4.2 Empirical model 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is R&D investment measured as the share of R&D expenditures on 
total sales. This R&D intensity measure is frequently used to take into account size effects 
(e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
We calculate for each firm the composition of the client portfolio of its main bank in its 
industry. We define the industry for this purpose at the two-digit NACE level for an 
aggregation that is neither too coarse nor too narrow, e.g. NACE34 covers firms in the 
automotive sector including OEMs and suppliers but not other transportation equipment. On 
the basis of this aggregation, a bank portfolio can be described along 84 different industry 
dimensions. We calculate the market share of a firm’s main bank in an industry as the number 
of firms in the focal firm’s industry in its client portfolio divided by all firms in this industry 
in Germany. This follows the basic rationale that all firms in an industry are the total pool of 
information from which a bank can potentially draw. We measure specialization as the 
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percentage of firms in the focal firm’s industry of the total portfolio of a firm’s main bank 
portfolio. To account for differences in firm size we include the number of employees as 
weights in the calculations of the shares. This should be considered as a proxy in the absence 
of detailed bank lending information for all firms. Individual lending information for each 
bank and its clients would be preferable. However, after consulting with industry experts, we 
conclude that banks are highly unlikely to divulge such information owing to concerns about 
confidentiality and competition. The coefficients of the main bank market share and 
specialization variables test hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively. We test hypotheses 3 through a 
multiplicative interaction of both variables, i.e. whether the specialization of a bank’s client 
portfolio in an industry where it has a large market share has an additional effect. 
For the test of hypothesis 4 we construct a variable at the industry level capturing the use of 
scientific knowledge. Cohen et al. (2002) construct a similar variable based on the Carnegie 
Mellon innovation survey. We follow their approach and access the equivalent survey for 
Germany conducted in 2001, one year ahead of our observation period. The particular survey 
question asks heads of R&D departments about external knowledge sources that were 
important for their innovation activities during the preceding three years. Question layout and 
design are well established in strategic management research on firm’s knowledge search (e.g. 
Laursen & Salter, 2006; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). The survey is representative of the 
German firm population and we obtain projected values for how many firms in an industry 
used knowledge from universities and/or research institutes. We include the variable as a 
main effect in the model and split the sample into two sub-samples with above/below average 
use of scientific knowledge in the industry. Hypothesis 4 would be supported if the effects 
from a main bank’s market share and specialization are stronger in the above average sub-
sample. 
Hypotheses 4 and 6 suggest effects from patenting, government R&D subsidies and venture 
capital investment. We add the EPO patent stock for each firm to the model (scaled per 
employee) and a dummy variable for the presence of a venture capital investor. The MIP 
survey provides information on whether the firm has received a government R&D subsidy at 
the European, federal or regional level. We include a dummy variable indicating whether this 
is the case or not. 
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Our theoretical model predicts several relationships based on the “ceteris paribus” 
assumption. We add several control variables to ensure unbiased results. At the bank level we 
control for the type of bank. The structure of the German banking system is often described as 
the “Three Pillar System“ (see e.g. Krahnen & Schmidt, 2004; Engerer & Schrooten, 2004) 
and consists of municipality-owned savings banks (in German: “Sparkassen”), cooperative 
and private banks. All these banks are active as universal banks. However, there is evidence 
that private banks differ in their decision making from say government-owned banks 
(Sapienza, 2004; Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2002). Hence, we add a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm’s main bank is a savings or cooperative bank. Similarly, banks 
may differ in their size and regional orientation because investments have been found to be 
more likely in geographical proximity (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 
2001). We add control variables for the total client corporate portfolio of a firm’s main bank 
(number of firms weighted by employees in logs) as well the share of client firms located in 
the same agglomeration area. 
Firms may work with multiple banks which can in turn alter their relationship with the main 
bank (Boot & Thakor, 2000; Ongena, Türmer-Alkan & Westernhagen, 2007; Elsas 2005). 
Hence, we add the number of a firm’s other banking contacts of a firm as a control variable to 
the model. Relationship length between a bank and its client has also been found to alter 
lending decisions (Herrera & Minetti, 2007). The overwhelming majority of the firms in our 
sample (86%) never change their main banking relationship during the five- year observation 
period. Hence, an exact measure of relationship length appears inappropriate. Conversely, we 
add a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has changed its main bank in the preceding 
three-year period. We proxy firm’s internal cash flow through the return on sales from the 
previous year and its overall creditworthiness through its credit score. Creditreform 
determines the credit score as an index based on a proprietary formula which places heavy 
penalties on negative events such as delayed payments to suppliers or insolvency. All indices 
are standardized to ensure comparability. In addition, firms that are traded on the stock 
exchange have broader access to external financing. We control for this effect by adding a 
dummy variable for whether the firm is incorporated based on stock market shares. 
Other factors may influence firm R&D decisions. Firms can suffer from liabilities of size or 
newness in their resource acquisition (e.g. Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2009). We add firm size 
(number of employees in logs) and firm age (number of years since founding) to the model. 
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Firms can also be part of a larger group and draw from its resources. Hence, we add a separate 
dummy variable for such cases. Finally, we capture remaining industry differences by 
including industry dummy variables. These follow grouped two-digit industry classes as 
suggested by OECD and Eurostat. The resulting groups are low-tech, medium low-tech, 
medium high-tech and high-tech manufacturing as well as low knowledge intensive and 
knowledge intensive services (see Appendix A for full details). Similarly, we add an 
additional control dummy for a firm’s location in eastern Germany which, a result of re-
unification, has been found to provide geographical opportunities and challenges different 
from those in westen Germany as (e.g. Czarnitzki, 2005). 
4.2.3 Estimation model 
A logical inference from our theoretical reasoning is that some firms may not be able to 
invest in R&D at all, i.e. their R&D investment equals zero. Hence, a technique is required 
that takes into account that the dependent variable being censored at zero. We estimate 
censored panel regression models. In particular, we estimate random effects Tobit models. 
Fixed effects tobit models are only beginning to emerge and existing approaches have been 
criticized for delivering inconsistent estimates as well as being overly demanding on assumed 
data and variation (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Grimpe & Kaiser, 2010). The inconsistency 
stems primarily from the finite nature of empirical samples. Non-linear, fixed-effects models 
suffer especially from inconsistency issues because estimates are more likely to be influenced 
by incidental parameters (Heckman, 1987; Neyman & Scott, 1948). Inconsistencies can be 
assumed to be reduced if the sample encompasses more than eight time periods, but random 
effects estimators are more commonly used (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Given our data 
availabilities, we opt for a random effects model. We run several model specifications and 
include the independent variables of interest stepwise.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
We inspect the dataset for multicollinearity based on correlations and variance inflation 
factors and find no evidence by any conventionally applied standard (e.g. Chatterjee & Hadi, 
2006). The mean variance inflation factor equals 1.63 with the highest individual variance 
inflation factor equaling 3.94 (see Appendix B for full details). Table 1 provides descriptive 
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statistics for the sample as well as a comprehensive overview of variable observation levels 
and scales. 
5 Results 
5.1 Main bank specialization and market share 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the tobit models testing hypotheses 1 and 2. Model 
1 contains only control variables and can serve as a benchmark for all other models. 
Significant effects remain stable across models and the quality of model fit increases (log 
likelihood and Chi squared test). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Model 2 includes the main effects of bank specialization and industry market share. A 
bank’s market share in the focal firm’s industry has a positive and highly significant effect on 
R&D investment. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported. The effect of bank specialization is 
negative and highly significant, lending support to hypothesis 2. We calculate effect sizes 
based on a one standard derivation difference from the average in main bank industry 
specialization and market share. The former reduces firm R&D intensity by 14%, the latter 
increases it by 6%. Hence, the effects are not just significantly different from zero but also 
have a sizeable impact on firm R&D. This result reinforces the theoretical logic that both 
portfolio and information externality theory can inform predictions of firm R&D investment 
through the main bank’s client portfolio. Diversification in firms’ main bank portfolio allows 
more firm R&D spending while the increasing industry specialization within a bank’s 
portfolio allow less. We test a simultaneous relationship by adding a multiplicative interaction 
term between bank specialization and market share in model 3. Interestingly, there is no 
immediate relationship between the two variables beyond the main effects. As a result, neither 
mitigating nor reinforcing effects can be found and hypothesis 3 has to be rejected. 
In hypothesis 4 we develop a theoretical argument for the effects to differing subject to the 
uncertainty in industry innovation activities depending on how far removed they are from 
application. The latter is proxied through the importance of scientific knowledge for 
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innovation in an industry, which has a consistently positive and significant effect on firm 
R&D investment in Table 2. We test hypothesis 4 by splitting the sample along the mean of 
the industry share of firms that use science as an input in their innovation activities. Table 3 
shows the estimation results for both sub-samples. The negative effect of bank specialization 
remains significant in both samples. However, the significance level drops strongly in the sub-
sample with industries that use less scientific knowledge. Conversely, the information 
externality effect appears to be confined to industries with an above-average use of scientific 
knowledge. Hence, hypothesis 4 is partially supported. Additionally, we test the significance 
of the multiplicative interaction effect between bank specialization and market share 
suggested in hypothesis 3 for the two sub-samples, too. There is no additional significant 
finding. Models are not reported. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
5.2 Signaling effects 
We have developed hypotheses on three kinds of signals firms can send to their main banks: 
patents, government R&D subsidies and venture capital investments. The main effects of all 
of these factors are positive and significant. This is fully in line with existing research 
emphasizing complementarity effects of R&D with existing knowledge stocks embodied in 
patents (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) as well as additionality effects from government R&D 
subsidies (e.g. Aerts & Schmidt, 2008), and growth-oriented venture capital investments (e.g. 
Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). However, the signaling effect that these factors may have on a 
firm’s main bank is novel. We add separate multiplicative interaction effects with each factor 
and bank specialization in models 4, 5 and 6. We use separate models for each interaction to 
avoid potential issues arising from multicollinearity. Table 4 shows the results for these 
models. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
All main effects remain stable. Only the interaction effect between a firm’s patent stock and 
its main bank’s degree of portfolio specialization is positive and significant (Model 4). There 
are no additional significant interaction effects for firms having attracted a venture capital 
investor or having received a government R&D subsidy (Model 5 and 6). All of the signals 
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fail to alter the positive effects from information externalities of a bank’s market share. In 
sum, hypothesis 5 is rejected. Hypothesis 6 is only supported for a firm’s patent stock. Our 
result are in line with Levitas & McFadyen (2009) who identify a similar positive patent 
effect for the venture capital market. In conclusion, the proposed signaling effects are limited 
to reputation effects based on the success of firms’ past patenting success. Hence, the 
signaling effect is firm-specific and based on past innovation outcomes. Input-oriented signals 
originating from successfully attracting government R&D subsidies or venture capital fail to 
alter the risk assessments or information position of banks. We suspect that this is due to the 
fact that they are general in nature and can be interpreted positively even without in-depth 
industry experience of a bank. 
5.3 Control variables 
All models contain an identical set of control variables. Their influence on firm R&D 
intensity is consistent across all models with regard to significance levels and directions. We 
have not developed theoretical predictions for any control variables but significant effects 
should be discussed briefly. First, it is noteworthy that out of all control variables at the bank 
level only the type of bank has a significant influence on firm R&D investment. An average 
firm working with a savings or cooperative main bank invests significantly less in R&D. This 
result supports other studies (Haselmann et al., 2009) which emphasize the inefficiencies in 
bank decision making induced by political influence through government ownership (Porta et 
al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004). R&D intensity increases with firm size but decreases with firm 
age. Similarly, incorporated firms having access to the stock market invest more in R&D. 
This provides evidence for the close relationship between overall resource availability for 
R&D investments (Ahuja, Lampert & Tandon, 2008) as well as R&D as part of a growth 
strategy for young firms (King & Levine, 1993). Similarly, the negative relationship between 
return on sales and R&D investment can be interpreted as an investment in generating the 
potential for future revenue streams in which the positive performance effects of current R&D 
are, on average, four to five years removed (Pakes & Schankerman, 1984). The significant 
industry dummies (low tech manufacturing is the reference group) indicate that the R&D 
investment is a direct reflection of technological opportunities and competitive pressures. 
R&D investment increases with the knowledge intensity of the industry in both manufacturing 
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and services. Low knowledge-intensive service sectors such as transportation are the 
exception reflecting fewer technological opportunities (e.g. Lyons, Chatman & Joyce, 2007). 
6 Consistency and sensitivity checks 
We estimate several additional empirical specifications to demonstrate the robustness of our 
findings. Appendix C shows the results. First, we investigate potential effects from the model 
choice. We replace the Tobit specification with an ordinary least squares regression in Model 
4. The core findings on the effects of main bank market share and sector specialization remain 
intact. All other consistency check models are again based on the original Tobit model for 
comparison with the main model. Secondly, we follow up on the results of the control 
variables regarding significant differences for savings and cooperative banks. We have 
dedicated controls for bank size and geographic scope in every model. However, banks may 
also differ in their structure. Especially large private banks with a national branch system can 
benefit from accessing the knowledge pool/risk diversification of the group as a whole. We 
recalculate all portfolio variables at the group level and estimate separate models for savings 
and cooperative banks (Model 5) as well as private and national banks (Model 6). Our core 
findings remain stable in both groups indicating that the effects are not dependent on 
assumptions about the aggregation level of the banks or limited to certain bank types. Thirdly, 
our sample split in Table 3 shows that the impact of the positive effects originating from 
information externalities on firm R&D investment are limited to sectors in which science is an 
important source of innovation. In an alternative operationalization, we capture the 
importance of science as a source of innovation based on the OECD classification for the 
R&D intensity of certain sectors (Appendix A). Within this framework, sectors are classified 
based on the ratio of firms that perform R&D continuously. Continuous R&D activities imply 
that the value of knowledge production is long term and accumulative in certain sectors but 
rather transitory in others. We assume that the sectors with accumulative knowledge 
production are closer to the scientific knowledge production than other sectors and test it by 
splitting the sample based on the OECD classification. Model 7 shows the estimation results 
for low technology industries encompassing low-tech manufacturing as well as low 
knowledge-intensive services. Model 8 presents the equivalent estimation results for high-tech 
industries, which include medium- as well as high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-
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intensive services. The results support our main finding that the described effects in 
hypotheses 1 and 2 are largely confined to high-tech sectors. We can no longer identify the 
significant negative effect of main bank industry specialization on firm R&D outside of 
science-based industries (Table 3) when compared with the low-tech industry classification in 
Model 8. Finally, our theoretical argument is strictly comparative in nature and combinations 
of firms and their main bank are assumed as given. This is largely in line with our descriptive 
statistics indicating that 85% of the firms in our sample never switch their main bank during 
the six year observation period. Nevertheless, firms and banks have made choices about this 
relationship at a certain point in time but this selection is unobservable to us. In order to test, 
whether the bank choice is correlated with the error term and may therefore bias the results, 
we estimate an additional instrument variable tobit model. The only bank choice variable 
available to us is whether the firm has changed its main bank in the preceding three years. We 
use this variable as the dependent variable in the first stage equation of the instrument variable 
estimation (Model 9). We rely on two regional variables (district level) as instruments. We 
argue that the economic development of a region provides firms as well as banks with more 
options. Hence, we use district GDP and then number of bank branches within a district (in 
logs) as instruments. The instruments are jointly significant at the 98% significance level; the 
number of bank branches is also individually significant. We conduct an additional Sargan 
test on potential overidentification which is rejected. Model 10 therefore contains the Tobit 
estimation results with the bank change being instrumented. Estimation results on our main 
hypothesis tests remain stable. In sum, we are confident that our empirical analyses provide 
reliable tests of our theoretical framework. 
7 Conclusions and Future Research 
In this study we question the general assumption that all banks suffer to the same degree 
from information deficits or asymmetries when providing funds for R&D intensive clients. 
We concede that banks cannot produce the necessary technological information themselves. 
They are, however, uniquely positioned to benefit from the information production of the 
firms in their client portfolio. Hence, they can benefit from an information externality which 
becomes important if the information is relevant to the technological and market environment 
of its clients, i.e. the bank has a large market share in the client’s industry. We compare and 
23 
 
contrast this effect with portfolio considerations and predict a negative relationship between a 
firm’s R&D investment and the industry specialization of its main bank. These theoretical 
predictions are supported by our empirical test for Germany based on a dataset that is, to our 
knowledge, unique in terms of variable coverage, representativeness, and comprehensiveness. 
The dataset also allows us to test whether the effects are equally pronounced in all industries. 
We find that the positive effect of information externalities is confined to high-tech industries 
in which academic research is a major source of knowledge. We have argued theoretically 
that this is due to increased uncertainties if innovation activities are further removed from 
commercial application. With regard to the signaling that the firm can provide itself about the 
quality of its R&D, we find that only patents provide valuable signals to banks, and not 
government R&D subsidies or venture capital investments. These findings have major 
implications for academic research as well as for practical management and policy 
development. 
From an academic perspective, our contribution consists in connecting research in finance 
and strategic management. On the finance side, there has been angrowing interest recently in 
the financing of firm innovation and growth (Herrera & Minetti, 2007; Benfratello et al., 
2008), in which findings from current strategy literature have largely been absent. Conversely, 
strategic management literature has been heavily focused on venture capital investments 
(Levitas & McFadyen, 2009) for firm innovation while largely ignoring the fact that these 
selective investments are dwarfed by the importance of bank financing for the vast majority of 
firms in most modern economies (Phelps & Tilman, 2010). We see our theoretical 
combination of information externality and portfolio theory as a valuable extension of both 
research streams because it provides a novel, differentiated perspective on the largely 
acknowledged root cause of information availabilities and asymmetries. What is more, we 
identify both opportunities for and boundaries of firm signaling to important external partners 
such as banks. Especially the boundary conditions of ineffective signals are, to our 
knowledge, largely unexplored in the literature (e.g. Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). 
Our theoretical and empirical findings are strictly comparative in nature, and interpretations 
of opportunities for active search and selection (either through banks or firms) have to be 
made carefully. We find clear evidence that a firm’s main bank makes a significant difference 
in the availability of funds for R&D investment. Hence, it follows only logically that firms 
should be better off working with highly diversified banks. The positive effects of working 
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with leading banks in a firm’s industry are limited to sectors in which there are great 
underlying uncertainties. Interestingly, risk considerations stemming from specialization in a 
bank’s industry portfolio are a less pressing issue for firms with have opportunities to signal 
the value of their R&D activities through patents. Venture capital investments or government 
R&D subsidies are, in themselves, valuable for firms but provide no further signaling effect to 
a firm’s main bank. 
On the policy making side, our results cast doubts on a general call for banks specializing in 
financing innovation. Banks with a broad industry portfolio are equally valuable because they 
can manage risks through diversification, especially for firms operating in more stable 
technological environments. What is more, we find that government R&D subsidies have 
value for firm R&D investment itself, but their effect as a signaling tool to banks should not 
be overestimated. A similar logic applies to the potential signaling of venture capital 
investors. 
In sum, our research provides a novel perspective on the relationship between banks, their 
information availabilities and the R&D investment of their firms. This provides fruitful 
avenues for future research. First, we develop and test strictly comparative arguments. This is 
partly due to the fact that the vast majority of the firms in our sample (85%) never change 
their main bank. However, more detailed insights into how firms and banks select these 
relationships would be an important addition to our current model both theoretically and 
empirically. Secondly, we are able to investigate our research question empirically for a large 
economy with a well-established, diverse financial system. However, European economies 
have been described as being especially reliant on bank financing. Comparative studies in 
Anglo-American settings could provide valuable insights into the international 
generalizability of our findings. Thirdly, we have focused on the firm’s R&D input side. 
Banks may influence not just overall R&D investment but also the nature of firm R&D as 
well as the outcomes. We suspect that this particular research question lends itself more to 
qualitative research but we are confident that our comprehensive, quantitative analyses 
provides a reliable basis for it. 
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9 Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Level Scale Obs Mean Std. dev. 
Share of R&D expenditure in total sales Firm ratio 7,294 0.03 0.09 
Bank sector specialization Bank continuous 7,294 5.93 7.54 
Bank industry market share Bank continuous 7,294 0.36 0.55 
Savings and cooperative banks Bank dummy 7,294 0.50 0.50 
Bank size (in logs) Bank continuous 7,294 10.33 1.28 
Bank geogr. scope Bank percentage 7,294 66.59 34.74 
No of banks Firm continuous 7,294 2.17 1.24 
Switch of bank relation Firm dummy 7,294 0.15 0.36 
Return on sales (t-1) Firm stand. index 7,294 -0.03 0.99 
Patentstock per empl. Firm ratio 7,294 0.00 0.01 
Company age since found. (years) Firm continuous 7,294 17.02 14.17 
No of employees Firm continuous 7,294 144.82 323.19 
Gov. R&D subsidy Firm dummy 7,294 0.16 0.36 
Credit rating Firm stand. index 7,294 -0.02 0.86 
Incorporated company on stocks Firm dummy 7,294 0.03 0.18 
Venture capital investor Firm dummy 7,294 0.00 0.07 
Part of company group Firm dummy 7,294 0.38 0.49 
Location East Germany Firm dummy 7,294 0.37 0.48 
Use of scientific knowledge  Industry percentage 7,294 50.98 13.29 
Medium-tech manuf. Industry dummy 7,294 0.29 0.45 
High-tech manuf. Industry dummy 7,294 0.08 0.28 
Low knowledge-intens. services Industry dummy 7,294 0.15 0.35 
Knowledge-intens. services Industry dummy 7,294 0.29 0.45 
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Table 2: Estimation results of tobit models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Bank sector specialization   -0.002*** -0.002*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank industry market share    0.013***  0.013**  
   (0.00) (0.01) 
Int: Bank spec. * market share    0.000 
     (0.00) 
Savings and cooperative banks -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank size (in logs) 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank geogr. scope 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Switch of bank relation 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No of banks -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Use of scientific knowledge   0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return on sales -0.003* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patentstock per empl.  1.864***  1.853***  1.853*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
No of employees  0.004**   0.004**   0.004**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Company age since found. (years) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gov. R&D subsidy  0.103***  0.103***  0.103*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Credit rating 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incorporated company on stocks  0.026**   0.023*  0.023* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Venture capital investor  0.129***  0.123***  0.123*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Part of company group 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Location eastern Germany -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Medium-tech manuf. -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
High-tech manuf.  0.032***  0.032***  0.032*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Low knowledge-intens. services -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Knowledge-intens. services 0.006  0.019**   0.019**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2003  -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2004  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2005   0.029***  0.029***  0.029*** 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.193*** -0.145*** -0.146*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
sigma_u   0.108***  0.107***  0.107*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
sigma_e   0.077***  0.077***  0.077*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 7294 7294 7294 
Number of IDs  4363 4363 4363 
LR Chi2  1249.870 1288.900 1289.000 
log likelihood 698.790 716.960 716.980 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Estimation results of tobit models with sub-samples of above/below average 
industry use of scientific knowledge 
Variable Industry with 
below average 
science use 
Industry with 
above average 
science use 
Bank sector specialization -0.000* -0.002*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Bank industry market share 0.000  0.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Savings and cooperative banks 0.000 -0.032*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Bank size (in logs) 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank geogr. scope 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Switch of bank relation  0.007**  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
No of banks 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Use of scientific knowledge  0.000  0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Return on sales 0.000 -0.006**  
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Patentstock per empl.  0.871***  1.847*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
No of employees  0.003***  0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Company age since found. (years) -0.003* -0.010**  
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Gov. R&D subsidy  0.046***  0.105*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Credit rating 0.000  0.007* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Incorporated company on stocks -0.010  0.034**  
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Venture capital investor  0.039**   0.138*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Part of company group 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Location eastern Germany -0.006* 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Medium-tech manuf.  0.018*** -0.056*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
High-tech manuf. omitted -0.01 
  (0.01) 
Low knowledge-intens. services -0.020*** -0.144*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) 
Knowledge-intens. services -0.020*** omitted 
 (0.00)  
Year 2003  -0.008**  -0.017**  
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Year 2004  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Year 2005   0.007**   0.036*** 
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Variable Industry with 
below average 
science use 
Industry with 
above average 
science use 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Year 2006  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -0.036**  -0.09 
 (0.02) (0.06) 
sigma_u   0.040***  0.120*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
sigma_e   0.027***  0.086*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 3254 4040 
Number of IDs  2033 2424 
LR Chi2  315.48 658.32 
log likelihood 660.56 595.31 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
38 
 
Table 4: Estimation results of tobit models including interaction effects 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Bank sector specialization -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank industry market share  0.012**   0.013***  0.013*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Savings and cooperative banks -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Int: Patents * bank sector spec.  0.002**      
 (0.00)     
Int: Patents * bank market share 0.000     
 (0.01)     
Int: VC * bank sector spec.   -0.012   
   (0.01)   
Int: VC * bank market share   0.002   
   (0.07)   
Int: Gov. subs. * bank sector spec.     0.001 
     (0.00) 
Int: Gov. subs. * bank market share     -0.001 
     (0.01) 
Bank size (in logs) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank geogr. scope 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Switch of bank relation 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No of banks -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Use of scientific knowledge   0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return on sales -0.004* -0.003* -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patentstock per empl.  1.677***  1.851***  1.861*** 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) 
No of employees  0.004**   0.004**   0.004**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Company age since found. (years) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gov. R&D subsidy  0.103***  0.103***  0.099*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Credit rating 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incorporated company on stocks  0.022*  0.023**   0.023**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Venture capital investor  0.123***  0.154***  0.123*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Part of company group -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Location eastern Germany -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Medium-tech manuf. -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
High-tech manuf.  0.032***  0.032***  0.033*** 
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Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Low knowledge-intens. services -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Knowledge-intens. services  0.019**   0.019**   0.020**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2003  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2004  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year 2005   0.028***  0.029***  0.028*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.144*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
sigma_u   0.107***  0.107***  0.107*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
sigma_e   0.077***  0.077***  0.077*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 7294 7294 7294 
Number of IDs  4363 4363 4363 
LR Chi2  1292.950 1292.080 1289.920 
log likelihood 719.320 717.990 717.840 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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10 Appendix 
Appendix A: Construction of industry variables 
Industry NACE Code Industry Group 
Mining and quarrying 10 – 14 Low-tech manufacturing 
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Low-tech manufacturing 
Textiles and leather 17 – 19 Low-tech manufacturing 
Wood / paper / publishing 20 – 22 Low-tech manufacturing 
Chemicals / petroleum  23 – 24 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Plastic / rubber  25 Low-tech manufacturing 
Glass / ceramics  26 Low-tech manufacturing 
Metal  27 – 28 Low-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 Medium tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of electrical machinery 30 – 32 High-tech manufacturing 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 High-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 – 35 Medium tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, sports 
equipment and toys 36 – 37 Low-tech manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40 – 41 Low-tech manufacturing 
Construction 45 Low-tech manufacturing 
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Low knowledge-intensive services 
Wholesale trade 51 Low knowledge-intensive services 
Transportation and communication 60 – 63, 64.1 Low knowledge-intensive services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Knowledge-intensive services 
Real estate activities and renting 70 – 71 Distributive services 
ICT services 72, 64.3 Knowledge-intensive services 
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Knowledge-intensive services 
Consulting 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive services 
Low-tech business-oriented services 74.5 – 74.8, 90 Low knowledge-intensive services 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) R&D int. 1.00      
(2) Bank sector 
specialization 
-0.06 1.00     
(3) Bank industry 
market share 
0.03 0.13 1.00    
(4) Savings and 
cooperative banks 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.35 1.00    
(5) Bank size (in logs) 0.05 -0.07 0.53 -0.45 1.00    
(6) Bank geogr. scope -0.04 0.00 -0.26 0.55 -0.34 1.00    
(7) No of banks 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 1.00    
(8) Switch of bank 
relation 
-0.09 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00    
(9) Return on sales 0.20 -0.01 0.04 -0.14 0.04 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 1.00    
(10) Patentstock per 
empl. 
-0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 1.00   
(11) Company age since 
found. (years) 
0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.05 1.00  
(12) No of employees -0.08 0.03 0.21 -0.21 0.11 -0.14 0.02 0.40 0.02 -0.02 0.11 1.00 
(13) Gov. R&D subsidy -0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.29 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.14 1.00
(14) Credit rating 0.38 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.10 1.00
(15) Incorporated 
company on stocks 
0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.17 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.26 -0.09 -0.02
(16) Venture capital 
investor 
0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.13 -0.13 0.08
(17) Part of company 
group 
0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05
(18) Location eastern 
Germany 
0.13 -0.09 0.13 -0.17 0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.31 0.06 0.17
(19) Use of scientific 
Knowl.  
-0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.18 0.09 -0.14 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.42 0.03 0.03
(20) Medium-tech 
manuf. 
0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.12 0.04 -0.23 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.16 -0.22 0.13
(21) High-tech manuf. -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.15 0.47 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.07
(22) Low Knowl.-
intens. serv. 
0.18 -0.14 0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.21
(23) Knowl.-intens. 
serv. 
-0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 -0.12
(24) Knowl.-intens. 
serv. 
0.13 0.33 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.22 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.23 -0.14 0.01
(25) Year 2003 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
(26) Year 2004 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02
(27) Year 2005 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.20
(28) Year 2006 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.02
 VIF  1.27 1.56 1.80 1.70 1.50 1.02 1.37 2.54 1.04 1.09 1.67 1.19 1.21
(15) Incorporated 
company on stocks 
1.00      
(16) Venture capital 
investor 
-0.10 1.00     
(17) Part of company 
group 
-0.02 0.07 1.00    
42 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(18) Location eastern 
Germany 
-0.11 0.08 0.07 1.00    
(19) Use of scientific 
Knowl.  
-0.13 0.07 0.04 0.21 1.00    
(20) Medium-tech 
manuf. 
0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.17 -0.10 1.00    
(21) High-tech manuf. -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.30 0.08 -0.05 1.00    
(22) Low Knowl.-
intens. serv. 
-0.02 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.04 0.00 -0.19 1.00    
(23) Knowl.-intens. 
serv. 
-0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.26 -0.12 1.00    
(24) Knowl.-intens. 
serv. 
0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.26 -0.08 0.08 -0.40 -0.19 -0.26 1.00   
(25) Year 2003 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00  
(26) Year 2004 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.21 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 1.00 
(27) Year 2005 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.27 1.00
(28) Year 2006 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.20 -0.37 -0.29 1.00
 VIF 1.11 1.08 1.02 1.43 1.34 1.22 3.98 2.39 1.77 3.02 1.35 1.80 1.66 1.82
 
Appendix C: Consistency check estimation results 
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
Full 
sample Sub sample
Sub 
sample 
Sub 
sample 
Sub 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
 
Regression Savings 
and 
cooperative 
banks 
Private 
and 
national 
banks 
Low tech 
industries 
High tech 
industries 
IV 1st 
stage - 
Bank 
switch 
IV 2nd 
stage  
Bank sector specialization -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank industry market share  0.006**   0.028**   0.001*** 0.002  0.013**  0.014  0.011**  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Savings and cooperative banks -0.010***   -0.004 -0.030***  0.043*** -0.030***
 (0.00)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank size (in logs) -0.001 0.000 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.008* -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank geogr. scope 0.000 -0.000*  0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Switch of bank relation 0.004 0.008 0.005  0.010*** 0.003   0.146 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)   (0.14) 
No of banks -0.001**  0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Use of scientific knowledge   0.001***  0.002***  0.002*** 0.000  0.003*** 0.001  0.002***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return on sales -0.004*** -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.005**  -0.003 -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patentstock per empl.  1.332***  1.442***  2.028***  0.962***  1.885*** -0.180  1.945***
 (0.30) (0.39) (0.37) (0.36) (0.31) (0.62) (0.26) 
No of employees -0.004*** 0.003  0.005**  0.003** 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Company age since found. (years) -0.003**  -0.010**  -0.009** -0.003* -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.007* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
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Gov. R&D subsidy  0.077***  0.096***  0.104***  0.044***  0.108*** 0.009  0.153***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Credit rating 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Incorporated company on stocks 0.011  0.046*** 0.001 -0.012  0.038*** -0.008 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Venture capital investor  0.083* 0.064  0.133*** 0.033  0.135*** -0.094  0.125***
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Part of company group -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.003  0.035*** 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Location eastern Germany 0.004 -0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005  0.027*** -0.013** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Medium-tech manuf. -0.015*** -0.007 -0.017     -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)     (0.02) (0.01) 
High-tech manuf.  0.018***  0.027*  0.030*    0.043*** -0.025  0.042***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Low knowledge-intens. services -0.010*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.019***   0.008 -0.063***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)   (0.02) (0.01) 
Knowledge-intens. services  0.019*** 0.013  0.041***    0.032*** -0.003  0.024***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Year 2003  -0.008*** -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.008 -0.019*** 0.014 -0.022** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Year 2004  -0.005* 0.002 -0.008  0.009** -0.006 0.014 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2005   0.009***  0.023***  0.028***  0.011***  0.033***  0.042***  0.033***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 2006  -0.003 -0.008 0.000 0.002 -0.003  0.050*** -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank branches in district (logs)       0.021***   
      (0.01)   
GDP in district      0.000   
      (0.00)   
Constant 0.017 -0.157*** -0.074* -0.035* -0.206***  0.174*** -0.161***
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
sigma_u    0.099***  0.114***  0.040***  0.118***   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
sigma_e    0.076***  0.073***  0.028***  0.083***   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Observations 7294 3676 3618 2503 4791 7294 7294 
Number of IDs  4363 2262 2154 1571 2865 4363 4363 
F-test/LR Chi2  22.94 555.83 731.25 188.84 795.30 5.83 1874.33 
log likelihood 8286.92 181.69 584.38 444.40 618.66 -2704.13 21888.10 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
